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Article 5

NOTES

A "LESS STRINGENT" STANDARD?

HOW TO GIVE

FLSA SECTION 16(b) A LIFE OF ITS OWN
Brian R. Gates*
INTRODUCTION

What could Jay Leno's recent anointing of Conan O'Brien as the
next successor to the Tonight Show legacy possibly teach us about civil
procedure within the federal courts? Not much, perhaps-except
that the immediate media speculation as to whether Conan would be
embraced by the Tonight Show faithful reminds us of the unenviable
challenges a lesser-known newcomer faces in trying to earn acceptance from an established audience. Resistant to change or uncomfortable with the possibility that "new" will translate to "dissatisfying,"
an audience may make constant comparisons to the older standardbearer, impose overwhelming pressure on the neophyte to conform to
familiar patterns, and saddle the newcomer with expectations of consistent, flawless performance. Conan's pending challenge, of course,
is no different from that faced by Leno himself when taking over for
Johnny Carson, or by Carson in his turn inheriting the slot from Jack
Parr. Nor is the phenomenon unique to the kings of late night talk
shows. Witness the challenges faced by Steve Young taking over the
helm of the San Francisco 49ers from the legendary quarterback Joe
Montana, or those of Sammy Hagar replacing David Lee Roth as the
frontman for Van Halen. Witness also the plight of section 16(b) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), struggling to find its own place
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2006; M.A., University of
Notre Dame, 1999; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1994. I would like to thank
Professor Amy Barrett and my fellow members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their

invaluable assistance and encouragement. This Note is dedicated to Connor and
Hannah, who patiently entertained each other while their father labored on this and
other projects.
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in a court system accustomed to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1
Granted, section 16(b) may not be as glamorous or publicly recognizable as the other examples above. Yet its story still confirms that,
whether one is a talk show host, sports icon, rock star, or obscure rule
of legal procedure, one must struggle to emerge from the shadow cast
by a favored precursor before gaining real acceptance from a skeptical
audience.
The challenge faced by section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act stems in large part from the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter the Rules) have long served as the federal
courts' handbook on how best to conduct any multi-plaintiff lawsuit. 2
Section 16(b), however, also offers potential plaintiffs a unique means
of joining together in the specific context of enforcing private rights
when challenging various abusive employer practices. Specifically,
that section provides as follows:
An action to recover the liability [for the payment of unpaid wages]
may be maintained against any employer (including a public
agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be
a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in
writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court
3
in which such action is brought.
This collective action device, characterized primarily by a vague "similarly situated" standard and written consent requirement (customarily
identified as an "opt-in" procedure), noticeably lacks the detailed, specific requirements of similar multi-plaintiff provisions in Rules 20 and
1 Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides for a collective action
enforcement mechanism in private actions brought pursuant to the Act. Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000)). For purposes of clarity, and because the relevant cases
are inconsistent in identifying the provision as section 16(b) or § 216(b), this Note
chooses to use section 16(b) as the exclusive identifier of the provision in issue and
will modify the language of the cases described below as needed to reflect that choice.
2 Note that section 16(b) does allow aggrieved parties to file a cause of action in
any "court of competent jurisdiction," including state courts. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(2000). Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of decisions that have contributed
to the development of section 16(b) doctrine have come out of the federal system.
Moreover, while some insight into the proper functioning of the collective action
mechanism has recently come from the courts of appeals (most notably the Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits), by and large the battle to understand section 16(b) has been
waged in the district courts.
3 Id.
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23. 4 Unfortunately, clues that might guide courts in interpreting the
"similarly situated" standard in section 16(b) are few and far between,
as the congressional record is virtually silent as to how Congress intended for section 16(b) to operate in practice.
Accustomed to the predictability, uniformity, and consistency
promised by the more clearly defined Rules, district court judges and
practitioners alike have struggled to discern section 16(b)'s proper
application. Indeed, so central are the Rules to the functioning of the
federal courts that some have argued that section 16(b) should simply
be superseded as a nonconforming procedural device. Others argue
that, even if section 16(b) is not to be summarily displaced, the Rules
are the polestar guiding the federal courts and therefore must necessarily inform any analysis of section 16(b)'s inadequately defined "similarly situated" standard.
Nevertheless, a consensus is growing slowly but steadily among
the courts that section 16(b) is entitled to a life of its own. Indeed, a
recent refrain arising within the district courts is that section 16(b)
presents "less stringent" requirements than the Rules and ought reasonably to function on its own terms without being subsumed by the
Rules' related provisions. 5 This Note, however, will question the wisdom of defining section 16(b) as a "less stringent" procedural mechanism. The Note will show that, even if section 16(b) can be accurately
described as a "less stringent" device, such a description ultimately
runs counter to the long-overdue recognition that section 16(b)
should claim its own place in the federal court system.
First, Part L.A of this Note briefly reviews the nascent origins of
the FLSA and the Rules to confirm that section 16(b)'s collective action mechanism was never subject to outright supersession by the
Rules. Part I.B discusses the subsequent revisions of both section
16(b) and Rule 23, which prompted some practitioners and courts to
reconsider the question of supersession in the mid-1970s. Part I concludes that the federal courts have remained true to congressional intent by rejecting section 16(b)'s supersession by the Rules and have
acted true to the purposes of the FLSA when endowing section 16(b)
with an identity all its own.
Regarding permissive joinder of parties and class action suits, respectively. See
R. Civ. P. 20, 23.
5 See, e.g., Carter v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., No. IP102CV01812SEBVSS,
2003 WL 23142183, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 23, 2003) (providing a representative example of how district courts have adopted language indicating that class certification is
"more lenient" under section 16(b) than under the Federal Rules without presenting
a clear articulation of how the FLSA certification is in fact more lenient or why it
should be so).
4

FED.
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Next, Part II examines the reasons why the courts have historically found it helpful to compare section 16(b) to the permissive joinder device in Rule 20. Part II.A focuses especially on the recent
reemergence of comparisons between section 16(b) and Rule 20
caused by the Grayson v. K Mart Corp.6 and Hipp v. Liberty NationalLife
Insurance Co.7 decisions coming out of the Eleventh Circuit. Part II.B
then explains why such comparisons are no longer useful to the
courts, as they will ultimately lead to greater court and practitioner
confusion and will frustrate judicial efforts to promote efficient resolution of controversies under section 16(b). In particular, Part II.B
points out the reasons why courts and commentators have found section 16(b) to have more in common with class actions under Rule 23
than with Rule 20's permissive joinder device. Those reasons are used
as additional justification for questioning the resurgence of interest in
Rule 20 as a guide for courts conducting the section 16(b) analysis.
Part III further explores the reasons why courts have found Rule
23 to be particularly useful in interpreting and defining the "similarly
situated" standard. Part III.A initially focuses on the district court's
logic in the Shushan v. University of Colorado at Boulders decision, which
provides the best articulated rationale for incorporating Rule 23 requirements into section 16(b) class certification. Part III.A then
shows why the Shushan argument has not won the support of a majority of district courts, which instead have developed an ad hoc, twotiered method of section 16(b) class certification. That ad hoc approach rejects the notion that section 16(b) opt-in plaintiffs must
meet Rule 23 requirements to proceed against a defending employer.
Part III.B then develops a synthesis of the courts' best insights into the
functioning of section 16(b) as a class action mechanism. That synthesis shows how, and why, the courts should now move beyond past
comparisons to allow section 16(b) to function optimally as a procedural device with characteristics all its own.
As a final consideration, Part IV asks whether pending congressional legislation in the form of a Class Action Fairness Act might have
any impact on the courts' understanding of section 16(b). In particular, Part IV argues such potential legislation provides further cause to
abandon the growing refrain that section 16(b) provides a "less stringent" mechanism than can be found in the Rules forjoining plaintiffs
together in a common cause against defendants. The Note concludes
that forgoing the identification of section 16(b) as a "less stringent"
6
7
8

79 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 1996).
252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2001).
132 F.R.D. 263, 264 (D. Colo. 1990).
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procedural device is a necessary next step in allowing section 16(b)
finally to fulfill its purpose as a collective action mechanism no longer
overshadowed by the dominating presence of the Rules.
I.

THE BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE

FLSA

AND THE FEDERAL RULES

What is the true relationship between the collective action provision in the FLSA's section 16(b) and the multi-plaintiff action provisions of the Federal Rules? On the surface level of their common
origins, at least, the FLSA and the Rules appear closely related. The
FLSA and the Rules were enacted in the same year and in fact took
effect a scant five weeks apart. One and the same Congress, then,
ushered both of the separate measures into being. As the following
sections show, however, from the beginning section 16(b) and the
similar provisions in the Rules served significantly separate purposes.
Indeed, despite their shared congressional lineage and close temporal
enactment, section 16(b) and the Rules were hammered out in distinctive forges fired by divergent social and political concerns.
Though evidence of congressional intent is woefully scant regarding
the provisions of section 16(b) itself, the history of the FLSA's enactment nevertheless confirms that Congress has never intended section
16(b) to be summarily superseded by the Rules.
The FLSA vs. the FederalRules: The Initial Case Against Supersession

A.

Our story begins over seventy years ago, in the often tumultuous
social milieu of the early 1930s. After thirty years of advocating for the
creation of a commission to propose one coherent and comprehensive set of procedural rules for the federal courts, the American Bar
Association finally got its wish. Due in no small part to the championing of the cause by Attorney General Homer S. Cummings, in 1934
Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act, which allowed the Supreme
Court to promulgate a definitive set of procedural regulations. 9 An
9

In part, the Act ofJune 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as

amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000)), provided as follows:
Be it enacted .. . [t]hat the Supreme Court of the United States shall have
the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United
States and the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings,
and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said
rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant. They shall take effect six months after their promulgation, and
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
Id., 48 Stat. at 1064.

1524

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 8o: 4

Advisory Committee was promptly formed, composed of distinguished
law school professors,judges, and practicing attorneys. That Committee successfully merged actions at law and suits in equity within the
federal courts, creating a system which substantially favored flexibility
over rigidity and decisions on the merits over procedural formality.
After careful scrutiny, the long-anticipated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were finally promulgated in the spring of 1938 and became
effective on September 16 of that year.
In that same decade, President Franklin Roosevelt's Administration labored to advance various "social" legislation programs in the
face of stiff resistance by the Supreme Court. Time and again, the
Court determined that congressional measures designed to control
price- and wage-fixing in various industries exceeded Congress's constitutional authority. 10 Then, in the spring of 1937 the Court appeared to shift abruptly its view of the constitutionality of such
regulations. Buoyed by the Court's decision to uphold the Labor Relations Act in the five Labor Board cases decided on April 12, the Administration quickly drafted a bill designed to regulate hours and
minimum wages for laborers while eliminating unnecessary child labor." The first draft of that bill, the original draft of the FLSA, was
introduced on May 24, 1937.12 After significant revision in both
houses, which included numerous concessions to the influential
American Friends of Labor (AF of L) to help ensure passage of the
bill,' 3 Congress approved a final version from ajoint conference committee onJune 13 (in the House) andJune 14 (in the Senate). President Roosevelt signed the measure on June 25, and four months later,
on October 24, the FLSA took effect. 14
10 See, e.g.,
Morehead v. NewYork ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936); Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
11 See Paul H. Douglas & Joseph Hackman, The FairLabor Standards Act of 1938
(pt. I), 53 POL. ScI. Q. 491, 493 (1938).
12 Although the identities of the drafters most responsible for crafting particular
provisions of the FLSA are lost to history, Professors Douglas and Hackman note:
"While Messrs. Black and Connery were the official sponsors of the bill, there is evidence that Senator Pope of Idaho and Assistant Attorney General Jackson played a
more active role in the drafting of the legislation." Id. at 493 n.9.
13 See id. at 506-14 (detailing the influence of the AF of L on revisions to the Act,
especially in the House, and concessions made by legislators to minimize AF of L
opposition).
14 The fact that some lingering confusion over the respective enactment timelines of the FLSA and the Rules has plagued the courts is reflected by a statement in
Bayles v. American Medical Response of Colorado., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Colo. 1996),
where the court identified the FLSA's enactment date (rather than the presidential
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After their enactment, the FLSA and the Federal Rules would
fatefully cross paths through one minor provision: namely, FLSA section 16(b). That section, dedicated to enforcement of the Act and
damages available to plaintiffs, originally provided as follows:
Action to recover [actual and liquidated damages for withheld minimum wages or overtime compensation] may be maintained in any
court of competent jurisdiction by one or more employees for and
in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly
situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent or
representative to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated .... 15
This section may indeed appear "minor" given the relatively slight
congressional attention evidently paid to the provision in comparison
with other aspects of the Act. The congressional record, for instance,
is completely silent as to any definition of the "similarly situated" standard and fails to mention why this particular enforcement procedure
was selected by Congress. Thus, "[b]eyond what has been quoted
from section 16(b), Congress did not explicitly attempt to spell out
the metes and bounds intended for these representative actions nor
did it suggest procedures to be followed" in the two kinds of represen16
One point which must be
tative actions authorized in section 16(b).
situated" standard
"similarly
the
emphasized, however, is that neither
nor the ability to designate a nonparty representative to maintain the
action in section 16(b) had any analogue in the class action procedure that had been adopted in Rule 23.
Nevertheless, the representative action enabled by section 16(b)
was not a procedural orphan, so to speak. Both Congress and the
courts had historically recognized several exceptions to the general
signing date) as June 25, and went on to surmise that "[i]t may be assumed that
Congress considered the proposed Rule 23(a) in 1938 in light of the newly passed
[section 16] and consciously decided to create different standards." Id. at 1066. In
fact, Congress had finished reviewing the Rules before the FLSA was ever signed. The
Rules became effective on September 16 only because the Supreme Court wanted to
allow three months after the end of the congressional session before the Rules took
effect so that the Bar could have ample time to familiarize itself with the Rules before
they became operative. The end of the congressional session was June 16. Recall the
FLSA was not signed in the House and Senate until the thirteenth and fourteenth of
June, respectively. More accurate, then, is the court's later assertion that "[i]t seems
entirely plausible that Rule 23, regardless of vintage, should not even be considered
in defining 'similarly situated' under [section 16(b)]." Id.
15 G. W. Foster, Jr., Jurisdiction,Rights, and Remedies for Group Wrongs Under the Fair
Labor StandardsAct: Special Federal Questions, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 295, 323 (reprinting 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) with explanatory alterations).
16 Id. at 324.
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rule that a representative party should be a member of the class represented. 1 7 Moreover, as a practical matter, the enforcement provisions
Congress selected make perfect sense in light of the FLSA's purpose
and perceived goals. After all, Congress designed the FLSA primarily
as a two-pronged attack on unhealthy labor practices, specifically depressed wages and extended working hours without overtime pay. It
was reasonable to postulate that, if one employee was suffering from
excessive hours without overtime pay or pay below the minimum
wage, the employee's situation was not isolated. More likely, the employee was just one of numerous workers enduring unfair conditions
caused by a particular practice of the employer. Thus, social and judicial interests in the economical and efficient resolution of controversies argued for allowing one employee to challenge the unfair practice
while permitting all similarly affected employees to be present in the
action and reap any benefits of a favorable judgment against the violating employer.
Furthermore, the section's unusual authorization of a nonparty
designated agent in the enforcement procedure is understandable
when one considers the role of labor unions, both actual and potential, in the history and hoped-for success of the FLSA. As mentioned
above, the AF of L had a significant voice in the actual shaping of the
FLSA in Congress. Also, immediately after the FLSA's enactment,
commentators, and surely members of Congress as well, anticipated
that labor unions could serve as effective watchdogs guarding employees from employer abuse and FLSA violations. Indeed, as Professors
Douglas and Hackman acknowledged early in 1939, "it is probable in
many instances the trade unions will become supplementary enforcing agents." 18 In this way, the representative measure of section 16(b)
"promise [d] to add to the effectiveness of the enforcement features of
the act."' 9 Moreover, although unstated in the congressional record,
Congress likely recognized the delicate situation employees were in
when challenging unfair employment practices. Fear of employer retribution or loss of livelihood could be strong disincentives for individuals to file suit in their own names under section 16(b). 20
17 See id. at 323 n.101.
18 Paul H. Douglas & Joseph Hackman, The FairLabor Standards Act of 1938 (pt.
II), 54 POL. Sci. Q. 29, 54 (1939).
19 Id.
20 Courts attempting to define the scope of representative actions under section
16(b) were in general agreement, however, that actions filed pursuant to that section
"should bind only those employees who in some fashion manifested their consent to
become involved in the action." Foster, supranote 15, at 324. Nevertheless, in Professor Foster's words:
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Accordingly, section 16(b)'s representative feature reasonably permitted influential unions and other pro-employee organizations to intercede on an individual's behalf to remedy employer abuses. From the
standpoints of reasonableness, logic, and perceived social realities,
therefore, the enforcement procedures incorporated into section
16(b) simply made sense.
The above historical overview prompts two observations critical to
a proper appreciation of section 16(b)'s intended operation in the
federal system. First, because the FLSA took effect five weeks after the
Federal Rules, even if section 16(b) were found to contain a procedure for certifying multi-plaintiff actions that was inconsistent with the
procedures in the Rules, section 16(b) would be safe from the super21
Second, and perhaps more
seding effects of the Rules Enabling Act.

importantly, the timeline shows the reasonableness of presuming that
Congress did not consider the FLSA to be a law "in conflict" in any
way with the Federal Rules. Granted, the Roosevelt Administration
22
may have felt pressured to rush the FLSA into being. Yet it seems
implausible to presume that the very Congress that recognized the
need to overhaul the federal court system by promulgating the Rules
For employees backed by a strong and aggressive union, the risk of employer
displeasure was likely to be less in situations where the employer generally
had resisted payment of minimum wages or overtime in an atmosphere that
left his employees with reason for concern that retaliation could be expected
if more effective pressures were brought to bear.
at
Id. 325 n.105.
21 Id. at 325 n.108 (citing the influential treatise Federal Practice by Professor
James William Moore, which clarified that "the Rules, having the force of statutes,
override statutory procedures in conflict on the date a Rule becomes effective.").
22 Admittedly, even shortly after the FLSA's enactment some speculated that political haste created less than ideal conditions for statutory clarity. For example, in a
case determining whether actions brought in state court under the FLSA should be
removable to federal court at the option of the defendant, the court in Booth v. Montgomery Ward & Co. determined as follows:
This court considers, therefore, that the act itself, fairly understood, ought
to be regarded as a clear indication of the legislative determination that the
employee may select, and remain in, the forum of his choice, for the assertion of his civil rights under it. That it might have accomplished its purpose
with greater nicety and clarity may be admitted. But one must not neglect
the historical fact that the measure, after lying long with scant hope of enactment, was finally passed in the haste incident to congressional adjournment,
which notoriously and unfortunately, intercepts adequate parturitional care
in the case of much of our most vital national legislation. That circumstance, while it is by no means, a substitute for legislative language, may be
reckoned with in weighing language actually employed.
44 F. Supp. 451, 456 (D. Neb. 1942).
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would, almost simultaneously, undermine the twin goals of consistency and uniformity in that system by introducing a conflicting procedural device. The better presumption is that Congress, recognizing
the particular goals and distinct sociopolitical pressures that spawned
the FLSA, believed section 16(b)'s private enforcement mechanism
would best serve the federal interests and remedial purposes embodied in the Act. While the Rules certainly embodied the accumulated
wisdom of scholars and practitioners on how best to construct general
court procedure to ensure fairness and efficiency in multi-plaintiff
lawsuits, the FLSA reflected Congress's assessment of specific social realities calling for a practical yet fair representative enforcement mechanism in a particular act designed to root out employer misconduct.
Thus, Congress allowed the FLSA from its inception to contain a procedural device that was something distinct from, but not inconsistent
with, the recently enacted provisions in the Federal Rules.
B.

Subsequent Amendments and the Reemergence
of the Supersession Question

Congress was spurred to amend the FLSA in 1947 after a trilogy
of Supreme Court cases substantially broadened the definition of a
compensable "workweek.

'23

The Court had determined that the

workweek definition should include travel time on company premises
along with any substantial time spent in preliminary activities such as
opening windows, changing clothes, or preparing tools. What most
alarmed Congress, however, was the Court's decision to apply the new
workweek interpretations retroactively, thereby subjecting employers
to liability for unpaid wages (barring an applicable state statute of limitations) all the way back to the effective date of the FLSA. Desiring
primarily to relieve employers from such expansive liability, Congress
passed the Portal-to-Portal Act on May 14, 1947, to "cut off claims for
activities not thought compensable at the time they took place." 24 In
23 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 691-94 (1946) (holding
employees were at work when walking between time clock and worksite, as well as

when engaged in preliminary activities "such as putting on aprons and overalls, re-

moving shirts, taping or greasing arms, putting on finger cots, preparing the equipment for productive work, turning on switches for lights and machinery, opening
windows and assembling and sharpening tools."); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local
No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am., 325 U.S. 161, 166 (1945) (holding coal miners were "at work" for FLSA purposes when traveling in mine shafts); Tenn. Coal, Iron
& R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944) (concluding that
miners were "at work" when traveling from the mine entrance to the underground
worksite).
24 Foster, supra note 15, at 333.
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the process, though, Congress also amended section 16(b) through
section 5 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, entitled "Representative Actions
Banned." In that section, Congress repealed section 16(b)'s representative feature, thereby requiring employees to file suit on their own
behalf, even though such employees retained the ability to file on be'2 5 In addition, Congress
half of other employees "similarly situated.
specifically required prospective plaintiffs to "opt-in" to a lawsuit by
filing formal consent to be bound by the judgment. Thus, as of 1947
section 16(b) was effectively amended to its present form, which in
relevant part states:
An action to recover the liability [for unpaid wages] may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to
any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become
such consent is filed in the court in which such
such a party and 26
brought.
is
action
This specific inclusion in section 16(b) of an opt-in requirement
to bind prospective plaintiffs caused courts to reconsider the supersession question after Congress amended Rule 23 in 1966 specifically to
abolish the opt-in procedural device. Indeed, whereas the initial version of Rule 23 had allowed the creation of what was called a "spurious" class through opt-in consents filed with the courts, the revised
Rule 23 was completely rewritten to exclude such spurious classes. Instead, Rule 23 required all class actions to be governed by an "opt-out"
procedure in which any member of a prospective class not affirmatively "opting-out" of the pending action would be bound by the judgment rendered. Because Rule 23 was re-promulgated almost twenty
years after the amendment to section 16(b) with a clear preference
for opt-out over opt-in procedures, courts were soon forced to consider whether section 16(b) was now truly "in conflict" with the rules
and subject to supersession by the newly rewritten Rule.
One court to face the renewed supersession argument head-on,
and ultimately to reject it, was the District Court for the Eastern Dis27
trict of Pennsylvania in Paddison v. Fidelity Bank. In Paddison,a plain25 Congress appears to have been motivated in part by concerns that allowing
representative lawsuits would encourage opportunistic "outsiders" to "stir up litiga-

tion." Elizabeth K. Spahn, Resurrectingthe Spurious Class: Opting-In to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act Through the FairLaborStandardsAct, 71 GEO.
L.J. 119, 129 n.56 (1982).
26 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
27 60 F.R.D. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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tiff wishing to pursue an Equal Pay Act (EPA) claim as a class action
"constructed an ingenious argument that the promulgation
of Federal
Rule 23 by the power of the Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
supercedes any previous inconsistent statutory procedural sections." 28
The court rejected the plaintiffs "ingenious argument," however, because of a brief parenthetical in the final version of the Rule 23 Advisory Committee's notes which stated simply that "[t]he present
provisions of [section 16(b)] are not intended to be affected by Rule
23, as amended." 29 Based on that unelaborated parenthetical,30 the
court felt "bound" to conclude that the supersession issue was moot
and that "the rules laid down by previous decisions concerning the
interpretation of [section 16(b) were] still valid." 31
By the mid-1970s, the federal courts had generally accepted that
in section 16(b) Congress presented the courts with a collective action
device that was "independent of and unrelated to" similar multi-plaintiffjoinder provisions in the Rules.3 2 The Advisory Committee's note
to amended Rule 23 was independent confirmation for the courts that
the reworked Rule was still not to supersede section 16(b). Instead,
that section continued to deserve respect as the procedural device of
choice in FLSA, EPA, and Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) actions. 33 Nevertheless, even after the courts had finally laid
the supersession question to rest, courts continued to struggle with
how best to understand the vague "similarly situated" standard in section 16(b). In the course of that struggle, courts have continued to
argue about the proper use of the Rules in informing the "similarly
situated" analysis. Indeed, as the next two parts of this Note demonstrate, the courts have repeatedly been unwilling, or even unable, to
develop an interpretation of section 16(b) that is not intimately tied
to the Rules. While the Rules have never been able to supersede sec28 Id. at 700.
29 Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104 (1966).
30 As Professor Spahn notes,
[i]n the absence of published minutes of the advisory committee proceedings, it is difficult to state definitively why the committee exempted [section
16 (b)] opt-in classes from the operation of the revised rule. Presumably, the
advisory committee believed it had no authority to alter statutorily defined
class procedures under the guise of a Federal Rules revision.
Sp-ahn, supra note 25, at 131.
31 Paddison, 60 F.R.D. at 700.
32 See, e.g., Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617, 622 (D. Kan. 1973).
33 See, e.g., Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co., 527 F.2d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 1975) (recognizing the continued vitality of the opt-in mechanism in ADEA cases and raising the
Advisory Committee parenthetical in a footnote to support its conclusions).

2005]

A

"LESS

STRINGENT"

STANDARD?

tion 16(b), the Rules have nonetheless cast a long shadow that has
frequently inhibited courts from fully understanding and utilizing section 16(b) on its own terms.

II.

SECTION

16(b) AS A PERMISSIVE JOINDER DEVICE:
THE SHADOW OF RULE

20

In 1805, Chief Justice John Marshall articulated the following
principle of statutory interpretation, which aptly describes the federal
courts' historical approach to section 16(b): "Where the mind labours
to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from
which aid can be derived ....,,34 Without question, courts and practitioners alike have long labored to develop a procedural framework
that could inform the analysis of when potential plaintiffs were "similarly situated" as required by the statute. Congress, having offered
courts no guidance within the FLSA itself or in advisory notes on how
to construct the "similarly situated" inquiry, implicitly directed the
courts to use their inherent authority and discretion to flesh out the
statutory standard. In response, and largely by virtue of section
16(b)'s nature as a collective action device, courts logically seized
upon similar multi-plaintiff provisions in the Rules to help articulate a
functional approach. After all, because courts and practitioners were
accustomed to using the Rules as the lens through which all procedural questions were viewed, they naturally succumbed to the temptation
to look to the Rules' well developed language for guidance when concrete questions arose concerning section 16(b)'s "similarly situated"
standard.
Imagine the following scenario: a plaintiff approaches a district
court and asks to be allowed to represent a group of "similarly situated" plaintiffs in a lawsuit against their collective employer under section 16(b). "But wait," counters the employer, "these employees
cannot possibly qualify as 'similarly situated' under the statute!" "Why
not?" asks the court. "Well," reasons the employer, "isn't section
16(b) just another mechanism for joining plaintiffs in a common
cause against a defendant? And doesn't this court have a model of
howjoinder of plaintiffs is supposed to operate in Rule 20, regarding
permissive joinder of parties and claims? If so, isn't it logical to suppose that these employees should meet any standards in Rule 20 to be
able to proceed under section 16(b)?" Suddenly, the court is confronted with a host of pressing questions. Is section 16(b) properly
characterized as a permissive joinder device analogous to Rule 20? If
34

United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805).
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so, does it make sense to require section 16(b) plaintiffs to meet the
same requirements as plaintiffs seeking formal joinder under the
Rule? To what extent does, or should, Rule 20 inform the "similarly
situated" analysis that the court must now conduct?
A district court confronting these questions would likely find it
helpful to learn that, historically, courts and commentators did indeed become accustomed to looking at section 16(b) as a type of permissive joinder device, akin to Rule 20. 3 5 Because section 16(b) did
not requirethe inclusion of "similarly situated" plaintiffs in the lawsuit,
and because named plaintiffs were therefore entitled to control the
shape and scope of their lawsuits, likening section 16(b) to the Rule
on permissive joinder was a natural move. Beginning in the mid1970s, however, comparisons between section 16(b) and Rule 20 fell
out of favor as courts became preoccupied with persistent questions
about the relationship between section 16(b) and Rule 23. Nevertheless, a renewed interest in Rule 20's usefulness in understanding the
"similarly situated" standard has arisen in the past decade due in no
small part to the Eleventh Circuit's opinions in two cases, Grayson v. K
Mart Corp. and Hipp v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co. Despite that
rekindled interest, however, our hypothetical district court would be
wise to exercise caution in using Rule 20 as its signpost on how to
arrive at a proper understanding of section 16(b)'s ideal operation.
Indeed, the following sections of this Note briefly review the ways in
which section 16(b) has been informed by comparisons to Rule 20,
and challenges the prudence of such comparisons.
A.

The Usefulness of Rule 20 in Understanding
the "Similarly Situated" Standard

The initial version of Rule 20, on the permissive joinder of parties, provided as follows:
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any
right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to
36
all of them will arise in the action.

35 See, e.g., Foster, supra note 15, at 335 (interpreting section 16(b) as a permissivejoinder device limiting "private damages actions to relief for those employees who
commence the action or who, prior to the trial on the merits, intervene or formally
give their consent to be included as parties plaintiff").
36 FED. R. CIv. P. 20 (1938) (amended 1966). Note that the quoted language of
the Rule has remained virtually unchanged since its initial enactment, the only altera-

tion being that the referent "them" after "question of law or fact common to all" has
been changed to "these persons." See

FED.

R. Crv. P. 20.
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When we compare the language of section 16(b) with that of the Rule
above, we see that section 16(b) resembles a permissive joinder device
in three key respects. First, section 16(b) does not require that all
similarly affected employees actively participate in a lawsuit initiated
by a plaintiff to challenge unfair employer practices. In other words,
section 16(b) does not postulate any necessary intervention orjoinder
of similarly impacted employees. Section 16(b)'s language provides,
instead, that one employee may sue on his or her own behalf. The
section does not indicate that the individual may do so only where the
individual alone has been affected. Congress therefore respected the
individual employee's interest in challenging the employer on the
merits of that singular employee's own particular circumstance. At
the same time, Congress respected any similarly impacted employee's
desire to avoid involuntary conflict with the employer. Thus, as G. W.
Foster explained, "the individual employee could sue or not as he
chose, controlling the litigation of his own rights, not obliged to
champion the rights of his fellow employees with similar3 7claims, and
free to reject the representation of his rights by others.
Second, neither section 16(b) nor Rule 20 require any quantum
of plaintiff participation before a court can find it wise and efficient to
resolve the combined disputed issues in one proceeding. That is, like
Rule 20, section 16(b)'s language does not insist upon any "critical
mass" of similarly affected employees beforejoinder will be permitted.
Conceivably, even under section 16(b) as initially written, any employee or representative could have filed suit against an employer on
behalf of just one or two similarly situated plaintiffs. By constructing
the statute in this way, Congress enabled the FLSA (and later the
ADEA and EPA) to be enforced under section 16(b)'s multi-plaintiff
device even when a small employer was challenged or when only a
small group of employees agreed to risk a legal confrontation with
their employer.
Finally, after section 5 of the Portal-to-Portal Act amended the
FLSA in 1947,38 section 16(b) required prospective "similarly situated"
plaintiffs to file affirmative consents with the court to be included in
39
the action and bound by the judgment. Thanks largely to the influential work of Professor James William Moore, the federal courts had
grown accustomed to identifying such opt-in class suits as permissive
37 Foster, supra note 15, at 310.
38 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
39 The current version provides that "[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to
any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(2000).
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joinder devices. 40 Taken together, these three similarities convinced a
majority of courts that section 16(b) should operate in certain practical, predictable ways as a permissive joinder device. For instance, a
majority of the courts understood section 16(b)'s permissive joinderstyle operation to require a pretrial determination of the scope of the
prospective class, and the courts therefore prohibited plaintiffs from
opting in after a favorable decision. 4 1
As a general matter, therefore, especially after the 1947 amendments to section 16(b), the federal courts eventually took it for
granted that the section demonstrated numerous features characteristic of a permissive joinder device. In one important respect, however,
section 16(b)'s operation was clearly not identical to that of Rule 20.
Specifically, while a plaintiff under Rule 20 formally appeared as a
party before the court and filed a pleading, the party joining a lawsuit
under section 16(b) needed only to file a written consent and thereafter neither formally appeared in court nor was included as a named
party in the caption of the case. But that difference aside, courts uniformly acknowledged that section 16(b) was akin to Rule 20 in the key
respect that a prospective plaintiff could only be included in the action and bound by the eventual outcome by affirmatively acting to be
associated with the lawsuit. 42 Having accepted that basic similarity,
most courts gave little consideration to any deeper relationship, or
lack thereof, between the requirements of Rule 20 and those of the
"similarly situated" standard in section 16(b).
Interestingly, however, a revival of thought has recently occurred
about the extent to which Rule 20 may be used to understand section
16(b), thanks primarily to the Eleventh Circuit's discussion in Grayson
v. K Mart Corp.4 3 Grayson involved an unusual circumstance in which
two groups of plaintiffs filed separate actions against K Mart in the
Northern District of Georgia in the same year and had their actions
assigned to separate judges, even though both groups alleged basically
40 See Spahn, supra note 25, at 128, 132 (discussing Moore's influence on court
views of the opt-in procedure and treatment of opt-in, or "spurious," class suits as
permissive joinder devices).
41 See Foster, supra note 15, at 325-26 (noting that while the FLSA is silent on
when opting in needs to occur, and while the remedial purposes of the Act might
even indicate that post-decision opting in of plaintiffs should be allowed, because the
courts recognized section 16(b) as containing "provisions for permissive joinder," the
courts were confined to battling over when, "in the pretrial stages of the action, it was
proper to cut off further participation by members of the class" who had not already
filed consents to join).
42 See, e.g., Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 264 (D. Colo.
1990).
43 79 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 1996).
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the same set of facts and legal theories in their age discrimination
claims. 44 For whatever reason, neither group initially sought to create
an opt-in class pursuant to section 16(b). Therefore, K Mart filed severance motions in both cases, alleging that the claims of the respective
plaintiffs were not properly joined under Rule 20. One of the judges
granted the motion for severance, evidently agreeing with K Mart that
the plaintiffs were not properlyjoined under Rule 20. 45 Shortly thereafter, the remaining group of plaintiffs amended its complaint in an
effort to create an opt-in class under section 16(b). 46 The members of
the first group, who had been ruled not properly joined under Rule
20, then filed opt-in notices in the remaining case. K Mart, not surprisingly, argued that because those plaintiffs were already ruled not
properly joined under Rule 20, it should follow that the plaintiffs
could not qualify as "similarly situated" under section 16(b) .4 7 Seeking guidance, the judge in the remaining case certified the following
question for interlocutory appeal: "Whether the 'similarly situated' requirement of [section 16(b)] is essentially the same as the requirement for joinder of additional plaintiffs under Fed.R.Civ.P. 20 and
42."48

The Eleventh Circuit determined that section 16(b)'s "similarly
situated" requirement "is more elastic and less stringent than the re49
quirements found in Rule 20 (joinder) and Rule 42 (severance).
Thus, even though the first group of plaintiffs was ruled improperly
joined under Rule 20, the group could still band together as opt-in
plaintiffs in the remaining case because "the standard for allowing an
opt-in joinder class under [section 16(b)] differs from, and is more
lenient than," the analogous standards embodied in the Rules. 50 The
court went on to find that, under section 16(b)'s "more liberal 'similarly situated' requirement," the potential plaintiffs had presented
51
more than ample evidence to qualify for inclusion.
In 2001, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its evaluation in Grayson
of section 16(b)'s standard in Hipp v. Liberty National Life Insurance
Co.52 In Hipp, the defendant challenged the district court's certifica-

tion of a plaintiff class under section 16(b). While finding that the
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 1091-92.
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1093.
Id.
Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1095-96.
252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2001).
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"decision to create an opt-in class under [section 16(b)] .. .remains
soundly within the discretion of the district court," the court reiterated that "the similarly situated requirement is not very stringent. '53
Furthermore, at least in the ADEA context, plaintiffs could fulfill the
"similarly situated" requirement when they met their "not heavy"
burden of supporting substantial, detailed allegations of discrimination
with affidavits "'which successfully engage defendants' affidavits to the
contrary.'- 54 Finding the Hipp plaintiffs had successfully met this burden, the court concluded, "[g]iven the flexibility of the similarly situated requirement under Grayson, we cannot find the district court
abused its discretion in allowing the opt-in class in this case."155 Hipp,
therefore, successfully solidified the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that
section 16(b)'s "similarly situated" requirement presents a "less stringent" standard forjoinder than do the comparative standards in Rule
20.
B.

Going Beyond Grayson and Hipp: Some Problems with the "Less
Stringent" Standard Analysis

Several problems exist with the Eleventh Circuit's decision to
characterize the "similarly situated" standard as "less stringent" than
the analogous requirements in Rule 20. First, neither Grayson nor
Hipp adequately explains exactly which of the Rule 20 requirements
are more demanding than section 16(b)'s "similarly situated" standard. After all, Rule 20 has two prerequisites: "(1) a right to relief
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and (2) some question of law or fact common to
all persons seeking to be joined. '5 6 To understand fully the implications of the Eleventh Circuit's conclusions, one must compare section
16(b)'s standard to both of those prerequisites and then determine
what a "more lenient" standard would entail.
One Florida district court rather bravely attempted just such a
task in Stone v. First Union Corp. In Stone, the court confronted the fact
that the Eleventh Circuit had failed to "take the next step of establishing how much less stringent [section 16(b)'s] requirements are in
practice, and what this means in terms of application of the criteria. '5 7
The court therefore had to answer for itself whether the court of ap53

Id. at 1218-19.

54

Id. at 1219 (quoting Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1097).

55
56
57

Id.
See Stone v. First Union Corp., 203 F.R.D. 532, 541 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
Id. at 540.
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peals considered the "similarly situated" requirement to be less stringent than one or both of Rule 20's prerequisites.
One step of the court's analysis was to determine how section
16(b) could be "less stringent" than Rule 20's requirement for some
common question of law or fact. Of course, it is difficult to know what
could be less demanding than "some common question of law or fact,"
except for "no common question of law or fact." Could it be, however,
that the Eleventh Circuit envisioned that district judges would certify a
class of prospective section 16(b) plaintiffs where no question of law
or fact was common to the parties seeking relief? The Stone court did
not seem to think that the court of appeals intended such a result, but
struggled to define exactly what was intended. Indeed, according to
the court, "[i]f the 'similarly situated' standard is more flexible (than
Rule 20), it necessarily follows that some common questions of law or
fact, but not all, must be shared among the putative plaintiffs with the
named plaintiffs in the common action."58 In effect, then, the court
merely offered a restatement of Rule 20's second prong in its attempt
to define the "similarly situated" standard and was strained to show
how section 16(b)'s requirements could be less demanding. The
court did add that, as a "less stringent" standard, section 16(b) might
allow for class certification even in the absence of a unified policy,
plan, or scheme of discrimination. 59 Yet finding that a unified plan of
discrimination is not essential to a section 16(b) action does not resolve whether some question of law or fact must be common to all
persons seeking to join in the action.
The Stone court fared only slightly better in expounding how section 16(b) could be "less stringent" than Rule 20's requirement of a
right to relief arising out of a common occurrence or series of occurrences. The court apparently concluded section 16(b) is "less stringent" insofar as plaintiffs may qualify as "similarly situated" "even if
the transactions or occurrences [underlying their claims] are not
identical. ' 60 That is, as a "more elastic standard," section 16(b) may
be satisfied where the "common nexus" uniting the plaintiffs is "based
upon different transactions or occurrences which are logically connected." 6 1 Again, though, such an interpretation fails to distinguish
section 16(b) from Rule 20 adequately enough to justify a "less stringent" label for section 16(b). After all, the Stone court itself acknowledged that "courts treat the term transaction flexibly" when
58

Id. at 541.

59
60
61

Id.
Id.
Id.
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interpreting Rule 20 and allow the Rule to comprehend a series of
occurrences that are connected through some ascertainable logical relationship. 62 If so, however, it is difficult to see how a group of plaintiffs seeking joinder under section 16(b) in discrimination claims
based upon a series of different yet logically connected instances of
employer misconduct would fail to meet the supposedly "more stringent" requirement in Rule 20.63

Ultimately, the court's struggle in Stone appears to stem largely
from a misapplication of Grayson's holding "that a unified policy,
plan, or scheme of discrimination may not be required to satisfy the
more liberal 'similarly situated' requirement of [section 16(b) ].

64

Ev-

idently, the Stone court thought that statement indicated what is ordinarily required to satisfy Rule 20's commonality requirement. 65
Typically, however, the federal courts consider allegations of a pattern
or practice of discrimination to satisfy the transactionrequirement in
Rule 20, not the commonality requirement. 6 6 What the Grayson court
most likely meant to assert, therefore, was that the "similarly situated"
standard is less stringent than Rule 20's transaction prerequisite insofar as joinder under Rule 20 would only be allowed when plaintiffs
suffered from a unified plan of discrimination, while such a unified
plan is not needed in the section 16(b) context.
If that, indeed, is the correct reading of Grayson's holding, the
holding stands on the uncertain presumption that such a unified plan
would in fact be necessary to support permissive joinder under Rule 20
when plaintiffs cannot otherwise show that they were affected by a related series of occurrences. At least one court, however, has found that
Rule 20's transaction requirement is met where the alleged discrimi62 Id.
63 Note that the Supreme Court has called for a liberal approach to permissive
joinder in the interests ofjudicial efficiency and economy. See United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (emphasizing that, "[u]nder the Rules, the impulse
is towards entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness
to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged").
64 Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1095 (11th Cir. 1996).
65 See Stone, 203 F.R.D. at 541. Note that this reading of Grayson was earlier suggested by another panel of Eleventh Circuit judges in Alexander v. Fulton County, Georgia, 207 F.3d 1303, 1324 (11th Cir. 2000). It is unclear from reading Grayson whether
the confusion exists in the subsequent decisions alone or if in fact the Grayson court
itself was unclear on which Rule 20 prong (or prongs) could be satisfied by the existence of a unified plan of discrimination.
66 See, e.g., Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1323 (discussing how a pattern or practice of
discrimination has been understood to provide the logical connection between claims
necessary to meet the transaction requirement and supportjoinder of parties).
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67
nation was "general and pervasive" rather than explicitly "unified.
Thus, the conclusion in Grayson that section 16(b) contains a "less
stringent" standard than Rule 20 is ultimately dissatisfying for three
reasons, all stemming from the imprecision of the court's analysis: (1)
Grayson failed to identify exactly which Rule 20 prerequisites the court
considers "more stringent" than section 16(b), (2) Grayson failed to
articulate the practical implications of its decision for district courts
wondering what a "less stringent approach" might involve, and (3)
Grayson did not adequately address a point that is central to its conclusion, namely the apparent presumption that a "unified" plan of discrimination would be necessary to support permissive joinder under
Rule 20.
Naturally, groups of prospective plaintiffs will want to engender a
particular reading of Grayson among the district courts: namely, that
under section 16(b)'s "less stringent" standard it should be easier for a
prospective group of plaintiffs to join together than it would be for
that same group to qualify for joinder under Rule 20. District courts
will be quite led astray, however, if they accept that rather skewed interpretation of Grayson. For, distilled to its essence, Grayson stands for
the following propositions only: (1) section 16(b) neither specifically
references Rule 20 nor incorporates Rule 20's requirements into its
language; (2) to conclude that a group of plaintiffs are "similarly situated," courts need not first determine that plaintiffs would meet Rule
20's two prerequisites; and (3) functionally speaking, ifit is true that a
"unified" practice of discrimination would be necessary for a group of
plaintiffs (not otherwise linked together by a common series of occurrences) to meet the transaction requirement of Rule 20(a) in an employment discrimination case, it may be the case that a group of
plaintiffs filing suit under section 16(b) can still qualify as "similarly
situated" even when such a "unified" practice cannot be proved, so
long as the plaintiffs can show some other logical relationship between their claims sufficient to convince a court that the plaintiffs are
indeed "similarly situated"-keeping in mind that the ultimate decision as to .how best to handle the lawsuit remains firmly in the district
court judge's discretion as emphasized by Hipp. That distilled essence, ultimately of questionable benefit to any but a very small subset
of potential section 16(b) plaintiffs, is all that district courts should
take from the Eleventh Circuit's "less stringent" characterization of
section 16(b).

67

King v. Pepsi Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 86 F.R.D. 4, 6 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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C. Distancingthe Courts from Continued Analogies to Rule 20: The
Transition to Rule 23
The court's struggle in Stone demonstrates how courts or practitioners who would read Grayson and Hipp to stand for more than the
distilled essence presented above, and who would use those decisions
as a springboard to inform the "similarly situated" standard through
continued comparisons to Rule 20, will have to spend considerable
time and mental energy to supply both the rationale and practical application that are lacking in Grayson and Hipp.68 Any potential gains
from such an enterprise, however, are likely not worth the costs. Increasingly, courts and commentators are turning away from analogies
between section 16(b) and the permissive joinder device in Rule 20,
and are articulating several persuasive reasons for doing so. In fact,
two such reasons can be found in cases that Grayson itself cites in support of its "less stringent" characterization of section 16(b): namely,
Ravel v. Svedala Industries, Inc.69 and Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v.
Sperling.70

First, in Ravel, the district court rejected the defendant's insistance that a group of plaintiffs should not be allowed to proceed collectively in an ADEA action against the employer because the
68 Note that as the primary support for its holding that the "similarly situated"
requirement is less stringent than that for joinder under Rule 20(a), the Grayson
court cites Ravel v. Svedala Industries, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Wis. 1994), where
the court opined that section 16(b)'s "similarly situated" requirement "'is considerably less stringent than the requirement of [Rule 23(b)(3)] that common questions
predominate,' or, presumably, the Rule 20(a) requirement that claims 'arise out of
the same transaction or occurrence.'" Id. at 553 (citation omitted). Unfortunately,
Ravel provides little justification for its "presumption" and cites no supporting case
law or secondary material. Indeed, the court's "presumption" seems to arise chiefly
out of its belief that section 16(b) plaintiffs need not show that their claims arose out
of the same transaction or occurrence under Rule 20. Id; see also infra notes 69-71
and accompanying text. Yet a presumption that section 16(b) is "less stringent" than
Rule 20 simply does not follow logically from the bare assertion that Rule 20's standards are inapplicable in a section 16(b) representative lawsuit. Furthermore, the
Ravel court only supports its assertion that section 16(b) is less stringent than Rule
23(b)(3)'s requirement that common questions predominate with a citation to the
district court's opinion in Heagney v. EuropeanAmerican Bank, 122 F.R.D. 125 (E.D.N.Y.

1988). There, a New York district court simply asserted in a footnote that section
16(b) is "of course" less stringent than Rule 23's requirement, again with no indication of the legal underpinnings of the assertion. See id. at 127 n.2. The point is that
any court or practitioner who follows the citation trail from Grayson looking for any
substantial rationale for the court of appeals's characterization of section 16(b) is
bound to be frustrated.
69 875 F. Supp. 550.
70 493 U.S. 165 (1989).
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plaintiffs' claims did not arise under the same transaction or occurrence under Rule 20(a). The court quickly dispatched that defense,
primarily on the basis that filing a claim under section 16(b) "obviates
the need to consider permissive joinder requirements under Rule
20(a)." 7' The court further reasoned that a multi-plaintiff claim could
be brought either by representative action or by joinder. 72 Because
section 16(b) authorized representative actions, "by definition . . .
[section 16(b)] is mutually exclusive from a multiple-plaintiff action
brought byjoinder. '73 In effect, therefore, the court found that section 16(b) presents a form of action more closely akin to Rule 23,
"which is the only type of representative action authorized under the
74
Federal Rules."
Similarly, in Sperling, the Supreme Court resolved a split among
the circuits largely by analogizing section 16(b) not to Rule 20, but
rather to Rule 23. The circuits had split on the issue of whether notice to prospective plaintiffs should be provided in ADEA cases filed
pursuant to section 16(b). One line of cases, exemplified by the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Dolan v. Project Construction Corp.,75 held
that, because Rule 23 actions were "diametrically opposed" to section
16(b) actions, 7 6 courts could not look to Rule 23 for authority to issue
notice to prospective plaintiffs. And without that rule, courts lacked
any authority to promulgate notice to section 16(b) prospective plaintiffs. 77 The Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing that the courts

should encourage collective actions due to "the advantage [to plaintiffs] of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of
resources" as well as the benefits to the judicial system of "efficient
resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising
from the same alleged discriminatory activity."' 78 Furthermore, the
Court asserted that the same justification for court-authorized notice
in Rule 23 cases, namely "'the potential for abuse [in the absence of
court direction], gives a district court both the duty and the broad
authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropri71 875 F. Supp. at 553.
72 Id. at 553 n.1. The reader may appreciate the irony that a case emphasizing
that section 16(b) contains a "mutually exclusive" form of action from Rule 20 is the
primary support for a case which has effectively resurrected court interest in using
Rule 20's prerequisites as a beacon for enlightening the "similarly situated" standard.
73 Id. at 553.
74 Id.
75 725 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1984).
76 Id. at 1267.
77 Id. at 1268.
78 Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989).
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ate orders governing the conduct of counsel and the parties."' 79
Thus, the Court determined that the same policies of judicial case
management and advancement of efficient, just results underlying
Rule 23 actions should apply equally to ADEA actions filed pursuant
to section 16(b)'s collective enforcement mechanism. As summarized
by one district court, "[t] he ADEA class action after Sperling is more
like the familiar class action under Rule 23 than a permissive joinder
device in which the passive role of the court is 'to administer and
monitor the litigation process."' 80
In addition to the indications from the cases above that courts are
better served analogizing section 16(b) to Rule 23 than to Rule 20,
one must consider the observations of Professor Elizabeth Spahn. In
her article, Representing the Spurious Class,8 1 Professor Spahn aptly demonstrates how the "determination of important issues, including the
availability of notice and, in age discrimination cases, the extent of
administrative exhaustion requirements, turns on whether one views
the opt-in FLSA action as a permissive joinder device or as a species of
class action. '8 2 Professor Spahn argues forcefully that viewing section
16(b) solely as a permissive joinder device is theoretically and practically inadequate, especially given that section's incorporation as the
enforcement mechanism in the ADEA and the EPA. For example,
Professor Spahn points out that treating section 16(b) as a joinder
device requires a court to assume that allegedly discriminatory acts are
isolated occurrences giving rise to distinct individual claims, while
treating the section as a class action "allows for the possibility that discrimination has occurred on a more widespread basis."'8 3 Furthermore, were courts to treat section 16(b) as a truejoinder device, each
prospective plaintiff in a section 16(b) action would have to meet individually the jurisdictional requirements of the court,8 4 and the courts
would be unable to provide notice of pending actions to prospective
plaintiffs. Finally, in the ADEA context, "[g] iven that nearly half of all
ADEA cases fail because of the complex administrative exhaustion requirements, permissive joinder of individuals, each of whom must
properly comply with the statutory requirements, is not an effective
device for aggregating claims and attacking systemic age discrimina79 Id. at 171 (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981)).
80 Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 262, 268 (D. Colo. 1990)
(quoting Walker v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 112 F.R.D. 44, 47 (D. Colo.
1986)).
81 Spahn, supra note 25.
82 Id. at 121.
83 Id. at 133.
84 See id. at 139.
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tion. ' 8 5- Spahn's proposed solution to these dilemmas, namely to treat
section 16(b) as a spurious class action, has not achieved substantial
acceptance in the courts. Courts historically have been receptive,
however, to the idea that section 16(b) is something more than just a
permissive joinder device and in fact should be compared to a class
action. It is to that latter comparison in the courts that this Note will
now turn.
III.

SECTION

16(b)

AS A CLASS ACTION MECHANISM:

THE SHADOW OF RULE

23

The FLSA contains no references to Rule 23. Nor is there any
indication that the FLSA drafters considered section 16(b) to present
a true "class action" mechanism that simply offered an alternative path
to class certification than did Rule 23. Nevertheless, section 16(b)
and Rule 23 have been inextricably intertwined on both theoretical
and practical levels, no doubt due at least in part to historical timing
and practitioners' confusion. With the advent of the Federal Rules,
courts naturally sought to develop coherent concepts and consistent
procedures to achieve the uniformity that the Rules sought to bring to
the federal system. When confronted with the collective action mechanism in the almost-simultaneously enacted FLSA, courts quite understandably looked to the Rules for guidance on how to handle and
manage group lawsuits. Indeed, courts were frequently forced to evaluate the two standards for class certification side by side because practitioners unclear as to how section 16(b) was supposed to work would
often attempt to certify an FLSA class under Rule 23. District court
judges, faced with such practitioner requests, frequently had to discern for themselves the congressionally intended relationship between section 16(b) and Rule 23.
A.

Reconciling Section 16(b) and Rule 23: HistoricalDevelopments and
the Present State of the Question

Initially, the task of reconciling section 16(b) and Rule 23 did not
seem such a daunting task for the courts due to certain key similarities
between their respective provisions. First, both provisions were apparently drafted with the intent to ease judicial burdens by simplifying
resolution of lawsuits where large groups of plaintiffs had a common
complaint against an offender. In the original version of Rule 23, the
Advisory Committee had generally adopted the test of Equity Rule 38
(Representatives of Class), which required that a class action could
85

Id. at 148.
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proceed where the question before the court was "one of common or
general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as
to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court."86 Rule
23 substantially incorporated that language and added a definition of
what constituted a "common or general interest." 87 A key feature of
the original class action rule, then, was what came to be known as the
"numerosity" requirement. That is, the courts were willing to
recognize a general exception to the principle that a person is not bound to
a judgment in personam in a litigation in which that person is not
designated as a party only where the sheer size of the class made joinder impracticable. Indeed, as the Supreme Court recognized in Hansberry v. Lee, 88 "[t]he class suit was an invention of equity to enable it to
proceed to a decree in suits where the number of those interested in
the subject of the litigation is so great that theirjoinder as parties in
conformity to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable." 89
Recall, the original representative action established by section
16(b) provided no minimum number of plaintiffs that had to be present to form a "similarly situated" group. Nor did section 16(b) provide any cap on the number of plaintiffs on whose behalf the suit
could proceed. Section 16(b), then, implicitly allowed a representative action to proceed where it involved so many potential plaintiffs
that joinder would otherwise have been impracticable. Thus, section
16(b) incorporated a feature that was similar to Rule 23 insofar as it
allowed for efficient resolution in one proceeding of what otherwise
would have to be accomplished through innumerable separate trials.
86

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES

AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 50 (William H. Dawson ed.,

1938).
87

As originally enacted, Rule 23(a) provided as follows:

(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as
to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them,
one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on
behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be
enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which
do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a) (1938) (amended 1966).

88
89

311 U.S. 32 (1940).
Id. at 41.
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More pointedly, however, after Congress enacted the Portal-toPortal Act in 1947, section 16(b) and Rule 23 were alike in their common use of an "opt-in" procedure that came to be known as a "spurious" class action device. Until 1966, Rule 23(a)(3) allowed class
action suits to proceed when the plaintiff rights to be enforced were
"several, and there [was] a common question of law or fact affecting
90
the several rights and a common relief [was] sought." This provision in Rule 23(a) (3) derived its title of "spurious" class1 action from
9
the influential work of Professor James William Moore. Moore, who
had drafted the initial version of Rule 23 and guided interpretation of
that Rule through his treatise Federal Practice, explained that those
class suits under Rule 23(a) (3) involving a common question of law or
fact should bind only those class members who opted into the lawsuit. 92 Later, when the Portal-to-Portal Act specifically amended sec-

tion 16(b) to require an opt-in affirmative consent procedure, section
16(b) and Rule 23 possessed a nearly identical mechanism to create a
representative group of plaintiffs. Thus, in both its potential for
numerosity and its opt-in requirements, from 1947 until 1966 section
16(b) was recognized as possessing key characteristics common to
class action suits under Rule 23.
In 1966, however, Rule 23 was completely rewritten. Added into
Rule 23 were four explicit prerequisites to a class action. Deleted
from Rule 23 was the "spurious" class action allowing for opt-in representative suits. After the 1966 amendments, therefore, Rule 23 and
section 16(b) no longer shared a common procedure for creation of a
representative class. Once again, section 16(b)'s procedural device included something distinctly different than what was contained in the
Federal Rules, which now uniformly required any plaintiff that did not
want to be bound by a certified class action proceeding to "opt-out" of
the pending action affirmatively.
Nevertheless, attorneys accustomed to having the world of federal
procedure operate in certain predictable and consistent ways would
still, from time to time, attempt to certify a class of prospective section
16(b) plaintiffs under Rule 23. One such attempt occurred in the
93

1975 case of LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.

In that case, the Fifth

Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's ADEA
claim brought as a class action under Rule 23. The court opened its
90 FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a)(3) (1938) (amended 1966).
91 See Spahn, supra note 25, at 127-28 (discussing Moore's influence on the development of Rule 23).
92 See id.
93 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975).
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discussion of the issue with the now ubiquitously appearing conclusion that "[t] here is a fundamental, irreconcilable difference between
the class action described by Rule 23 and that provided for by FLSA
[section] 16(b)." 94 Indeed, "Rule 23(c) provides for 'opt out' class
actions. FLSA [section] 16(b) allows as class members only those who
'opt in.' These two types of class actions are mutually exclusive
and
irreconcilable." 95 Therefore, according to the court, "Rule 23 cannot
be invoked to circumvent the consent requirement of the third sentence of FLSA [section] 16(b)," which unambiguously requires written, filed consent before a party may be included in a suit and bound
by a judgment. 9 6 LaChapellequickly became the leading case cited by
courts emphasizing that Rule 23 is simply inapplicable when a group
of plaintiffs seek to bring a collective action lawsuit under a statute
incorporating section 16(b). 97

Even after LaChapelle and its companion cases, however, the district courts continue to divide over how much Rule 23's various requirements should inform the "similarly situated" analysis. No case
has more emphatically argued that Rule 23's requirements should inform section 16(b) than a 1990 case out of Colorado, Shushan v. University of Colorado at Boulder.9 8 In that case, the district court was very
concerned that finding Rule 23 "wholly inapplicable" to class action
suits under section 16(b) would render that vague provision "practi-

cally formless." 9 9 The court reasoned that while LaChapelle correctly
determined that section 16(b)'s opt-in feature is manifestly irreconcilable with Rule 23's opt-out feature, it would be a "non sequitu"' to conclude that "every other feature of [R]ule 23 is similarly irreconcilable
with [section 16(b)]."' 0 0 Moreover, the court found it insensible to
suppose that Congress would want the federal courts to "discard the
compass of [R]ule 23 entirely and navigate the murky waters of such
[section 16 (b)] actions by the stars or whatever other instruments they
may fashion." 10 1
94 Id. at 288.
95 Id. at 289.
96 Id.
97 One such case is Church v. ConsolidatedFreightways, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 294 (N.D.
Cal. 1991), which, while agreeing "that some of Rule 23's procedures may be helpful
in the management of [class actions brought pursuant to section 16(b)]," nevertheless cited LaChapellewhen emphasizing that " [t) he clear weight of authority holds that
Rule 23 procedures are inappropriate for the prosecution of class actions under [section 16(b)]." Id. at 305-06.
98 132 F.R.D. 263 (D. Colo. 1990).
99 Id. at 266.

100
101

Id.
Id.
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The Shushan court further supported its conclusion by heavily
drawing upon the Supreme Court's decision in Sperling, where the
Court concluded that court-supervised notice to prospective plaintiffs
was appropriate in ADEA cases. The Shushan court recounted how,
[s]tressing the benefits of collective action to both ADEA plaintiffs
and the judicial system, the Court observed that district courts have
"the requisite procedural authority to manage the process ofjoining
multiple parties in a manner that is orderly, sensible, and not otheror the provisions of the Fedwise contrary to statutory commands
10 2
eral Rules of Civil Procedure."
Thus, although Congress had never explicitly incorporated Rule
23's requirements into section 16(b), the district court in Shushan
thought that the Supreme Court had issued a firm directive to consider the Rules when interpreting the "similarly situated" standard.
After considering the Supreme Court's use of Rule 23's policy and
philosophy in Sperling and the potential formlessness of section 16(b)
without Rule 23's requirements, the Shushan court held "that the
named representative plaintiffs in an ADEA class action must satisfy all
of those requirements of Rule 23, insofar as those requirements are consistent with [section 16(b)]." 10 3
The court's decision in Shushan to apply Rule 23's requirements
to section 16(b) has not been widely embraced by the district courts.
Nevertheless, there has been a small but very respectful following.
Even those districts choosing a different course often acknowledge
the Shushan court's thoughtful and well-reasoned approach, and have
had to contend with the court's conclusions. One such dissenting
voice came from the district judge in Bayles v. American Medical Response of Colorado, Inc.,10 4 who noted that "Shushan represents a herculean effort to provide structure to the nebulous 'similarly situated'
standard by turning to the time-tested notions of Rule 23."105 Nevertheless, the Bayles court concluded Shushan had "adopt[ed] modern
10 6 and argued that "if Rule
Rule 23 standards without explanation"
23's standards apply to § [16(b)] at all, it must be through Rule 23 as
° Yet ultimately the Bayles court found even
it existed prior to 1966."107
the analogy between section 16(b) and pre-1966 Rule 23 unpersuasive, because the court could not explain "why collective actions were
102 Id. at 267-68 (quoting Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170
(1989)).
103 Id. at 265.

104 950 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Colo. 1996).
105
106
107

Id. at 1063.
Id.
Id. at 1064.
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treated as class actions in the first place." 108 In fact, the judge noted,
" [s]ection [16(b)] does not reference Rule 23, and I have not discovered any reason why the definition of 'similarly situated' did not
evolve independently."' 0 9 The Bayles court therefore lamented that
the district courts "appear to have assumed that [section 16] could not
stand alone and needed to be pigeon-holed into one of the former
Rule 23 categories."' 10
Despite the Bayles court's astute observations, it failed to perceive
the key thrust of the logic underlying Shushan. Central to the Shushan
court's reasoning was that any class action procedure needs to accomplish two essential objectives: (1) protection of potential plaintiffs and
(2) protection of the court's interests in effective and efficient case
management. Indeed, in the words of the Shushan court, "the procedures embodied in Rule 23 are designed not only to protect the rights
of class members, but also to allow effective disposition and management of the litigation.""' In other words, through all of its various
incarnations, Rule 23 has sought to embody those policies that the
federal courts have determined most effectively protect the interests
of the litigants and the position of the court. Shushan looks to modern Rule 23's requirements, therefore, because those requirements
present the most up-to-date understanding of how best to serve court
and litigant interests in representative actions. Thus, as the paradigmatic expression of how active, managerial courts should promote efficient case resolution and litigant protection, Rule 23 should
necessarily inform those representative actions filed pursuant to section 16(b).
Shortly after Shushan, however, a California district court offered
a counterargument in Church v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc." 2 that
typifies the response of most district courts to the reasoning in Shushan. In Church, the court was not persuaded "that in Sperling the Supreme Court's discussion of a court's managerial responsibilities of
joining multiple parties was intended to invoke, verbatim, the procedures of Rule 23" into cases brought pursuant to section 16(b). l" 3 In
part, the Church court rejected the Shushan rationale by recognizing
that section 16(b)'s opt-in features enable courts to presume that certain protections have already been afforded to prospective plaintiffs.
In particular, according to the court, protective measures such as Rule
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id. at 1066.
Id.
Id.
Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 267 (D. Colo. 1990).
137 F.R.D. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
Id. at 306.
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23(a)(4)'s adequacy of representation requirement and Rule
23(b) (3)'s common questions predominating requirement are "not as
crucial [in cases filed pursuant to section 16(b)] because ajudgment
stemming from a class action does not bind a class member unless
that member filed a written consent to join the action." 1 4 Therefore,
the court concluded, because section 16(b) plaintiffs are not bound
unless they affirmatively opt in to the action, "they are in less need of
Rule 23's protection than opt-out plaintiffs who are bound unless they
take affirmative steps with the court to sever themselves from the
1
class." 15
Agreeing that section 16(b)'s opt-in feature allays at least some of
the concerns addressed by Rule 23's requirements, the majority of districts have proceeded to decide certification issues without using the
Rule and indeed without even defining the "similarly situated" standard. Instead, the courts have generally been "content to decide the
question ad hoc, based upon the plain language of the statute and
16
general principles ofjudicial economy and fairness to the litigants.""1
One of the earlier, and now leading, cases in the effort to promote a
functional ad hoc approach to section1 7 16(b) cases was a 1987 case out
of New Jersey, Lusardi v. Xerox Corp.'
In Lusardi, the court decided to decertify a class of opt-in plaintiffs that had previously obtained conditional certification for notice
purposes to prospective members of the class. At the earliest stages of
the action, the court had issued a Conditional Certification Order to
advance the remedial purposes of the ADEA by allowing plaintiffs to

114

Id.

115 Id. Note that Church further justifies the nonincorporation of Rule 23 requirements into section 16(b) on the grounds that "such a requirement would impede
ADEA plaintiffs' opportunity to proceed collectively and, therefore, is contrary to the
broad remedial purposes of prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination." Id. Nevertheless, the fact that the ADEA, FLSA, and EPA are remedial statutes does not alone
justify abandoning Rule 23 requirements, especially Rule 23(b) (3)'s requirement that
common questions predominate. After all, Congress has specifically provided that
Rule 23 is applicable in class actions brought pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. See Spahn, supra note 25, at 131-32 (raising the issue of Title VI's enforcement and pointing out the structural similarities and overlap between the ADEA,
EPA, and Title VII). It seems nonsensical to posit that the remedial purposes of a
statute targeting age discrimination merit a less stringent requirement for class certification than the remedial purposes of a statute targeting sex and racial discrimination.
Bayles v. Am. Med. Response of Colo., 950 F. Supp. 1053, 1067 (D. Colo. 1996).
117 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987), vacated in part on other grounds, 122 F.R.D. 463
(D.NJ. 1988).
116
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communicate with prospective members. 118 This early conditional
certification, however, was necessarily based upon little more than the
initial pleadings and affidavits available at the start of the action.
Thus, the Lusardi court determined that a second certification decision should be made at or near the close of discovery, when the court
could make a more informed decision about the appropriateness of a
section 16(b) representative action. 119 The Lusardi court then proposed the following four factors to consider at the second stage of
certification: (1) the disparate factual and employment settings of the
individual plaintiffs, (2) the various defenses available to the defendant that appear to be individual to each plaintiff, (3) fairness and
procedural considerations, and (4) the apparent absence of filings required by the applicable remedial statute. 20
While the Lusardi factors have been frequently cited, subsequent
district courts have added to or restated the Lusardi factors as they
have deemed necessary. Indeed, Am. Jur. 2dJob Discriminationsection
2184 lists as many as fourteen factors that courts commonly consider
in analyzing the "similarly situated" class at the post-discovery stage. 12'
Despite the lack of agreement among districts as to which factors are
conclusive in the two-tiered analysis, the majority of district courts
generally agree that the ad hoc, two-tiered approach offers benefits
for both plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs can obtain court-approved, court-supervised notice to build the class to meet the remedial
purposes of the congressional statutes. Defendants, meanwhile, can
obtain the court's assistance in inquiring as to whether a manageable
class even exists or whether defendants would be subjected to unfair
prejudice through unwarranted solicitation sent to prospective plaintiffs. The courts still recognize, however, that "[a] determination as to
whether class members are similarly situated is always fact-specific."' 122
Due in large part to this recognition that the facts of individual cases
demand a flexible approach, the ad hoc, two-tiered analysis to section
16(b) class certification has taken firm hold in most districts and is
now the preferred means of addressing challenges to certification. 123
118 Id. at 354 (quoting the issuing judge's statement that notice was appropriate
"to let these people communicate in a meaningful way with that group of people
that
they say they can prove were wronged").
119
120
121
122

Id. at 359.
Id.
45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination§ 2184 (2002).
Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 392, 405 (D.N.J. 1988).

123 See, e.g., Vaszlavik v. Storage Tech. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 672, 678-79 (D. Colo.
1997) (applying the ad hoc approach); see also David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation
of Wage and Hour Collective Actions Under the FairLabor StandardsAct, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
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Nevertheless, the federal courts continue to debate the degree to
which Rule 23's various requirements might prove helpful in guiding
certification questions arising under section 16(b). The lingering
confusion appears to result, at least in part, from a belief that class
certification on a practical level is likely to reach the same results regardless of whether or not Rule 23 is used in a court's analysis. In124
the Tenth Circuit
deed, in Thiessen v. General Electric Capital Corp.,
reviewed the approaches courts had taken to resolving the "similarly
situated" issue and concluded that "there is little difference in the various approaches. All approaches allow for consideration of the same
or similar factors, and generally provide a district court with discretion
1 25
Perhaps fortuito deny certification for trial management reasons.'
classes of
prospective
that
time
a
for
seem
did
it
courts,
the
for
tously
approach
the
of
regardless
decertified
plaintiffs would have been
used.' 2 6 As late as June 1995, the Fifth Circuit was able to note that,
based on its review of the case law to that point, "no representative
class ha[d] ever survived the second stage of review" where courts had
127
used the ad hoc approach.
To date, the circuit courts have refused to define the "similarly
situated" standard precisely or even to mandate that lower courts in
the circuits adopt one particular approach to section 16(b) group certification. In fact, only three of the circuits have formally considered
the issue of how best to define the "similarly situated" standard. As
noted above, the Tenth Circuit found little difference in the various
approaches, and while opining that the ad hoc approach is arguably
the best of the available alternatives insofar as it is not tied to Rule 23
standards, it held only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in employing the ad hoc approach. The court of appeals issued
no formal directive that district courts must follow any particular approach in subsequent cases.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, while noting that the two-tiered
approach "appears to be an effective tool" and "suggest[ing] that district courts in this circuit adopt it in the future," also emphasized that
"[n] othing in our circuit precedent ... requires district courts to utilEMP. POL'YJ. 129, 135 (2003) ("[A] consensus has been reached on how [section
16(b)] cases should be evaluated. It is clear that the two-step ad hoc approach is the
preferred method for making the similarly situated analysis .....
124 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001).
125 Id. at 1105.
126 See, e.g., Bayles v. Am. Med. Response of Colo., 950 F. Supp. 1053, 1067 (D.
Colo. 1996) (explaining how the prospective class would be decertified regardless of
whether Rule 23's requirements had to be met by the prospective class).
127 See Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Corp., 54 F.3d 1207, 1214 (5th Cir. 1995).
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ize this approach."' 128 Thus, the court of appeals refused to overturn
the decision of a districtjudge not to utilize the two-tiered approach, a
decision that according to the appellant resulted in the erroneous certification of the prospective class. The only other circuit to address
the issue, the Fifth Circuit, found it "unnecessary to decide" which of
the competing methodologies should be employed in class certification decisions, since in the case before the court the district court
would not have abused its discretion in decertifying the class no mat129
ter which approach was used.
Thus, for the time being the district courts retain virtually unfettered discretion in deciding which approach to use to consider certification of a proposed group of opt-in plaintiffs under section 16(b).
No one set of factors has emerged as definitive considerations in the
ad hoc approach. Courts have reached no clear consensus on which
combination, if any, of the requirements contained in Rule 23 should
be mandatory, or even just advisory, as considerations in certifying the
class. As more cases come before the courts, however, and especially
as courts increasingly accept the idea that Rule 23 contains "far more
stringent" requirements than section 16(b), 130 the departure between
class certification under the various standards is certain to become
more pronounced. Indeed, the Hipp case came before the Eleventh
Circuit upon the very charge that a different district court approach
to class certification would have yielded different results.' 8 ' Thus, developing a single, comprehensive approach that incorporates the federal courts' best insights into section 16(b)'s proper operation is
essential if consistency, predictability, and uniformity are to be preserved in the federal system.
B.

A Proposalfor Moving Forward:Beyond Comparisons with Rule 23

To advance the effective and consistent application of section
16(b), the federal courts should draw upon the established decisional
law to develop an approach that meets several specific goals. First,
because the majority of courts have already embraced the ad hoc
128 See Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001).
129 See Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1216 (noting that regardless of how the court analyzed
the "similarly situated" requirement, "we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion in finding that the 'opt-in' plaintiffs were not similarly situated. In so holding we specifically do not endorse the methodology employed by the district court,
and do not sanction any particular methodology").
130 See, e.g., Church v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 294, 306 (N.D. Cal.
1991) (referring specifically to Rule 23(b) (3)'s requirement that common questions
predominate).
131 Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1217.

2005]

A

"LESS

STRINGENT"

STANDARD?

1553

method as most conducive to the remedial purposes of the relevant
statutes and respectful of the fact-specific nature of the certification
inquiry, the approach must retain the ad hoc method's basic twotiered structure and overall flexibility. Second, the chosen approach
should highlight the benefits to plaintiffs and courts that can come
from utilizing section 16(b)'s opt-in feature. Third, the approach
should advance the federal goals of efficient and economical resolution of controversies by respecting the Supreme Court's recognition
that district courts have a managerial responsibility in representative
lawsuits. Fourth, to promote finality and consistency, the approach
should be reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard, avoiding
the need or incentive for appellants to seek de novo review of the
certification decision. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the approach must promote justice, fairness, and the remedial purposes of
the applicable statutes by adequately protecting the valid interests of
all the parties concerned.
As an initial step, the courts should silence the recurring refrain
that the "similarly situated" standard is "less stringent" than particular
requirements in Rule 23. In the main, courts comparing section
16(b) to Rule 23 use the "less stringent" label when finding that the
"similarly situated" standard does not share Rule 23(b) (3)'s requirement that common questions predominate. Yet no true consensus
has been reached on the extent to which the "similarly situated" standard is "less stringent" than various other Rule 23 requirements. District courts' time and resources are inefficiently spent when judges
must repeatedly survey the available (often confusing and contradictory) case law to discern, explain, and justify to litigants how and
where certification issues will be treated less stringently in the section
16(b) context.
Furthermore, repeating the "less stringent" refrain poses increased risks of confusion in the typical two-tiered approach to class
certification, where courts already speak of a "fairly lenient standard"
being used at the initial stage to conditionally certify a class while
speaking of a "higher standard" being used after discovery is complete. 13 2 Because the courts themselves often seem unclear at exactly
which stage(s) the section 16(b) analysis will be "less stringent," practitioners and litigants are bound to be uncertain as to how and when to
argue particular decertification challenges before the court. In even
the best circumstances, use of the "less stringent" label forces courts to
132 See, e.g., Champneys v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., No. IP 02-535-C H/K, 2003 WL
1562219, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 11, 2003) (citing Moss v. Crawford & Co., 201 F.R.D.
398, 409 (W.D. Pa. 2000)).
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define the "similarly situated" standard against Rule 23. Courts must
first consider what results Rule 23 would yield on a particular certification issue and then ask how section 16(b), as a "less stringent" device,
may alter the analysis. Thus, because it is imprecise, inadequately defined, confusing in the ad hoc, two-tiered structure, and binds the
"similarly situated" analysis to a parallel analysis of the Rules, courts
should jettison the "less stringent" label that is presently attached to
section 16(b). Court and practitioner interests in clarity, predictability, and efficient allocation of resources are best served by retaining
the particular language of the two-tiered method, separate from unnecessary complications caused by comparisons to Rule 23.
For section 16(b) to function fully on its own merits, however, the
courts will have to develop an approach to certification issues that emphasizes the practical effects of section 16(b)'s opt-in requirement.
Specifically, when prospective class members file affirmative consents
under section 16(b), courts may justifiably presume that the class
members have thoughtfully considered their options and will actively
promote their own interests.13 3 Recognizing that section 16(b)'s optin feature raises a presumption of active, informed, self-interested
class members advances court interests in efficiency by saving courts
from having to conduct detailed inquiries into whether each individual class member's interests are adequately represented by the named
plaintiff. Moreover, the presumption would have the effect of encouraging the desired plaintiff behavior, as prospective opt-in members
would be on notice to look after their own interests and to make informed decisions about the benefits of joining the pending lawsuit
over bringing an individual claim.
Furthermore, recognizing this presumptive effect of section
16(b)'s opt-in feature would strengthen the rationale behind the favored ad hoc, two-tiered approach to group certification in FLSA,
133 In Shushan, the district court expressed the concern that a person who files a
written consent under section 16(b) "should not be expected fully to appreciate actual or potential conflicts between himself and the class representatives" in the same
way as would a person who actually intervenes in the action, and therefore the courts
should still conduct an independent assessment of whether there is adequacy of representation by the designated plaintiffs and lawyers. Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at
Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 267 (D. Colo. 1990). Most courts, however, have been willing to recognize that opt-in plaintiffs who elect to join a suit through formal consent
can be afforded the presumption of tending to their own interests and monitoring
developments in the lawsuit to ensure their individual goals are in fact advanced. See,
e.g., Church, 137 F.R.D. at 306 (explaining that the adequate representation requirements of Rule 23(a) (4) are "not as crucial" in the section 16(b) context "because a
judgment stemming from a class action does not bind a class member unless that
member filed a written consent to join the action").
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ADEA, and EPA cases. Courts use the two-tiered approach because,
when plaintiffs initially request certification for notice purposes to
prospective opt-in plaintiffs, courts do not feel capable of making a
completely informed decision because substantial discovery has not
yet been completed. 1 34 The courts are nevertheless concerned that
early obstacles to initial group certification would impede the remedial purposes of the statutes by prohibiting plaintiffs from gathering
greater information about unfair defendant practices and obtaining
support from similarly impacted employees. By recognizing a presumption that consenting class members' interests will be adequately
protected and represented, courts can better justify a conditional certification of the prospective class.
Also, by carrying the presumption through the discovery stage
and into the trial, the court would place the burden upon any party
that would challenge class certification on grounds of insufficient
plaintiff protections to come forward with substantial evidence to support the charge. Thus, the presumption would further efficient resolution of disputes by requiring challenging defendants to substantiate
any charge that consenting members do not in fact know what is best
for them. At the same time, the presumption would serve the remedial purposes of the applicable statutes by extending to consenting
members the benefit of the doubt that such members are acting in
their own best interests.
Recognizing that section 16(b)'s opt-in feature enables courts to
reasonably presume that individual consenting members' interests will
be adequately protected, however, does not mean that the courts must
abandon their managerial responsibility. Instead, the presumption
should be a rebuttable one, and when a court is presented with evidence that opt-in members' interests are not being adequately represented or protected, the court should intervene to remedy whatever
defects exist in the representation. The Seventh Circuit's decision in
Woodall v. Drake HoteP35 provides a model of this approach, as the
court recognized that in the unusual circumstances of that case judicial intervention was necessary to protect the rights of two opt-in
134 See Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 (10th Cir.
2001); see also Vaszlavik v. Storage Tech. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 672, 678 (D. Colo. 1997)
(providing an opinion by the same judge who authored the Bayles opinion, which
applies the ad hoc approach at the notice stage and notes that the ad hoc approach at
this stage "'require[s] nothing more than substantial allegations that the putative
class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan'" (quoting Bayles v. Am. Med. Response of Colo., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1053, 1066 (D. Colo.

1996))).
135 913 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1990).
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plaintiffs who had effectively been left in the dark by a failure of adequate representation and notice.
In Woodall, the Seventh Circuit faced a situation in which two out
of fifty-four consenting ADEA plaintiffs were left out of a settlement
after the district court granted class counsel's unexplained motion to
withdraw from representation of those two plaintiffs. Unable to secure other counsel, the two plaintiffs were not included in conferences and negotiations and did not receive notice of proceedings
from the court. After being left out of the settlement, the two requested on appeal that the circuit court "apply the protection of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) to an ADEA class action."1 3

6

Under Rule 23(e),

"[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as
the court directs."13 7 While acknowledging that "the procedures for
institutinga class action under the Federal Rules and under section
16(b) are different and exclusive of each other," the plaintiffs nevertheless contended that, "once an ADEA plaintiff has opted-in, and a
Federal Rules plaintiff has not opted-out, both sets of plaintiffs are
similarly situated and should be accorded the same protection by a
court."

13 8

The Seventh Circuit agreed with the basic thrust of the plaintiffs'
contention, finding that "[m]any of the policy reasons underlying the
requirements of Rule 23(e) are applicable to ADEA class actions."'13 9
Specifically, Rule 23(e) is intended "to safeguard the rights of class
members and allow consideration of the broader implications of a
class action settlement"'140 while ensuring that the class representatives
or counsel act in the best interests of the class as a whole. Typically,
according to the court, ADEA plaintiffs are not "'absent' in the way
Federal Rules plaintiffs may be absent" because " [t] he ADEA enforcement mechanism contemplates individual participation in the collective action.'

141

Nevertheless, in the circumstance before the court,

the two plaintiffs without counsel, "like the 'absent' class members,
must rely on the district court as a backstop to insure that the settlement was fair and reasonable."' 4 2 Thus, the court recognized that the
general policy embodied in Rule 23 of judicial management of cases
136
137

Id. at 450.
R. Civ. P. 23(e).

FED.

138

Woodall, 913 F.2d at 450-51.

139

Id. at 451.

140

Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir. 1980)).

141

Id.

142

Id.
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for protection of plaintiffs should extend to ADEA class actions in the
appropriate circumstances. Therefore, while the court "stop[ped]
short of holding that Rule 23(e) should be applied generally to all
ADEA class actions," in the case before the court the district court had
clearly "abused its discretion by dismissing the class cause of action by
plaintiffs
reason of settlement" without protecting the "absent"
1 43
through appropriate notice of the pending settlement.
The Woodall case, therefore, stands for the following two essential
propositions in the context of understanding section 16(b) on its own
merits: (1) courts must maintain an active, managerial role throughout proceedings filed under section 16(b) to intervene when individual consenting members' interests are clearly not adequately
protected, and (2) while Rule 23's individual requirements should not
be incorporated wholesale into the section 16(b) analysis, section
16(b) as a representative enforcement mechanism should reflect the
same policy concerns of just and efficient resolution of controversies
that underlie Rule 23. As the Shushan decision forcefully reminds us,
however, Rule 23 is driven not only by concerns for the protection of
absent class members, but also by concerns for efficient and effective
dispute resolution. 144 Thus, courts must craft an approach to section
16(b) that is carefully attentive to the needs of both litigants and the
courts at both the district and appellate court level.
As seen above," 45 a rebuttable presumption of adequate protections to plaintiff interests afforded by section 16(b)'s opt-in feature
advances court interests in efficiency while respecting both plaintiff
interests and the remedial purposes of the FLSA, ADEA, and EPA. We
must still inquire, however, whether that opt-in feature also helps
courts to decide whether common questions should predominate in
lawsuits pursuant to section 16(b). As the Church court argued, the
requirement that common questions predominate, found in Rule
23(b) (3), is primarily geared towards protecting the interests of absent class members in the Rule's opt-out context. Thus, section
16(b)'s opt-in feature effectively renders that requirement inapplicable in section 16(b) cases "because opt-in plaintiffs have presumably
decided that the benefits of proceeding as a class member outweigh
any benefits of bringing an individual action where claims that
143

Id. at 451-52.

144 See Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 267 (D. Colo. 1990)
(arguing "the procedures embodied in [R]ule 23 are designed not only to protect the
rights of class members, but also to allow effective disposition and management of the
litigation").
145

See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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On the other

hand, the Shushan court insisted that the requirement that common
questions predominate has "little to do with protection of class rights
and much to do with handling the lawsuit effectively." 14 7 For the Shu-

shan court, therefore, the requirement is primarily directed to the interests of the court in effective case management. Hence, resolving
the issue of whether common questions should predominate in the
"similarly situated" analysis would seem to depend upon how one
characterizes the underlying interests served by the requirement.
The most reasonable conclusion is that there is at least some
truth to both the Shushan and Church positions. That is, the Shushan
analysis reasonably supports the position that the efficient resolution
of representative actions requires some critical mass of issues common
to all the members. On the other hand, the Church analysis reasonably supports the view that a wholesale incorporation of Rule 23(b) (3)
into the "similarly situated" analysis would not give due import to the
proper operation and effect of section 16(b)'s opt-in requirement. A
compromise position does exist, however, which can incorporate the
relevant insights of both the Shushan and Church decisions. The compromise position effectively rephrases Rule 23(b) (3)'s language to the
negative. That is, rather than insisting that common questions
predominate, the compromise position looks to ensure that individual
148
questions do not predominate.
Arguably, investigating whether individual questions do not
predominate at trial would, in practical operation in the courts, produce negligibly different results than investigating whether common
questions do predominate. The rephrasing of the requirement, however, has the distinct advantage of avoiding Rule 23(b) (3)'s language,
thereby signaling to courts that the "similarly situated" analysis of section 16(b) does not require uncritical incorporation of Rule 23's
requirements. Moreover, the rephrased recommendation 149 empha146 Church v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 294, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
147 Shushan, 132 F.R.D. at 267.
148 Indeed, the consideration as to whether individual questions would
predominate at trial has already been identified by some courts utilizing the ad hoc
approach as a relevant, even key consideration during the second stage of the "similarly situated" analysis. See Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1103
(10th Cir. 2001).
149 This Note uses the term "recommendation" rather than "requirement" for the
following two reasons: (1) to emphasize that the plain language of section 16(b) does
not explicitly "require" that individual questions do not predominate and (2) to remain consistent with this Note's insistence on keeping the certification decision firmly
within the discretion of the managerial district court. The courts should not exclude
the (albeit unlikely) possibility that in a specific set of circumstances the interests of
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sizes the degree to which the presence of a substantial degree of common issues at trial serves both court and defendant interests. Where
individual questions predominate, the union of claims in one collecand
tive action would not lead to efficient resolution of key disputes
150
the
At
would therefore run counter to policies ofjudicial economy.
same time, predominating individual questions could adversely
prejudice defendants by resulting in an indefinite trial, confusion of
issues, and unreasonable defendant expenses in conducting discovery
on the merits of each individual consenting member's claim.
Ultimately, therefore, the recommendation that individual questions must not predominate is just a shorthand way of saying that a
court will continue to weigh the interests of both defendants and the
courts themselves when deciding whether to recognize a potential
group of plaintiffs as "similarly situated" under section 16(b). That is,
the court will not certify a class where predominating individual questions would prejudice defendants' ability to defend their cases or
where inefficiency and confusion of issues will arise. Thus, the recommendation preserves the discretion of the district courts in promoting
the most efficient resolution of disputes. For, in the end, the courts
retain discretion to determine when individual questions are so prevalent that court and litigant interests would not be served by allowing
the representative action to proceed.
Furthermore, by emphasizing the role of the district courts' discretion, the recommendation that individual questions should not
predominate promotes the finality of certification decisions and eases
the burden of the appellate courts. Disappointed litigants are less inclined to seek review of unfavorable decisions when they know the
appellate court will not conduct a plenary, de novo review of the district court's determination. And where decisions are challenged, the
courts of appeals can focus their review upon the district courts' application of a particular standard. That is, the reviewing court can narrow its inquiry to whether the district court abused its discretion in
all parties are best served by allowing the representative action to proceed to trial
even where individual questions predominate. That being said, because prejudice to
a defendant, confusion of issues, and inefficient use of court resources is so likely to
occur where individual issues do predominate, the "recommendation" will most likely
be elevated in practice to the status of a requirement, albeit an implicit one that
attaches to section 16(b) collective actions solely by virtue of their nature as representative lawsuits.
150 See Bayles v. Am. Med. Response of Colo., 950 F. Supp. 1053, 1067 (D. Colo.
1996) ("[A]voiding the prospect of eighty separate trials upon decertification may
serve some measure of judicial economy. However, given the number of individual
issues that must be resolved, I am not persuaded that a single trial would save significant time or effort.").
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concluding that defendants would be unfairly prejudiced or the court
would be unnecessarily burdened by recognizing the proposed group
of plaintiffs as "similarly situated." The reviewing court would not
need to concern itself with the particular factors the court below selected in its fact-specific analysis, except insofar as those factors, taken
together, supported or cast suspicion upon the lower court's ultimate
exercise of discretion.
To summarize, when a prospective group of plaintiffs comes to a
district court seeking to institute a representative action under the
FLSA, ADEA, or EPA, the court should adopt the following approach.
First, the court should make it clear to all parties that section 16(b)
alone will govern the action and that the requirements of Rule 20 and
Rule 23 will not direct the court's analysis. At the early stage of the
action, the court should promote the remedial purposes of the applicable statute by using a lenient certification standard marked by a presumption that section 16(b)'s opt-in feature will adequately protect
plaintiff interests. Though initially lenient in its analysis, the court's
stage one certification decision must take into account the potentially
unfair burden of discovery placed upon defendants. Should the court
decide to conditionally certify the class, near the end of discovery the
court should conduct a more thorough balancing of interests, considering all available facts, to decide whether to recognize the potential
plaintiffs as "similarly situated."'15 1 A key component of that balance is
the determination of whether individual questions predominate.
Where such predominating individual issues would cause confusion of
issues, inefficient use of court resources, or prejudice to defendants,
certification should not occur.
Throughout the pretrial process, plaintiffs and defendants
should be able to ask the court to consider any reasonable inference,
based upon the facts, which would tend to support or question the
court's recognition of the opt-in members as "similarly situated."
Moreover, throughout the trial the court must be attentive to any substantially supported suggestion that individual opt-in members' interests are not adequately protected or represented. The court must
maintain an active, managerial role throughout the trial to be responsive to any evidence that rebuts the presumption of informed opt-in
participants whose interests are being adequately advanced by the
151 Courts applying the ad hoc approach have wisely avoided the temptation to
insist upon a single definition of the "similarly situated" standard. Because collective
action certifications are so highly fact specific and because Congress incorporated
section 16(b) into multiple remedial statutes, no single definition could reasonably
capture the many considerations that litigants validly raise as critical to the "similarly
situated" analysis.
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named plaintiff(s). While both plaintiffs and defendants should urge
the court to consider whatever factors argue for or against the fairness
and efficiency of allowing the representative action to proceed, all
parties should accept that, ultimately, the district court has discretion
in weighing any factors and balancing all the relevant interests in conducting the "similarly situated" analysis.
IV.

A

FINAL CONSIDERATION: THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED CLASS
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON SECTION 16(b).

To date, Rule 23 has been the repository of policy and procedure
guiding the federal courts in the proper management of class actions.
A new, looming presence on the legal horizon, however, threatens to
substantially alter the class action landscape. For the past two years,
Congress has been seriously evaluating the merits of a Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA), drafted purportedly to remedy perceived abuses
in class action procedures. Congress has expressed particular concern
that class actions are negatively affecting both the national economy
5 2 The proposed Act
and the respectability of the judicial process.'
would primarily affect the scope of federal court jurisdiction over interstate class actions, 153 plus would control various aspects of proposed settlement procedure, including calculation of attorneys'
1 55 and notification
fees, 154 distribution of proceeds to class members,
56 The question which
of the settlement to federal and state officials.'
arises is, if the CAFA is a statement of congressional intent regarding
the procedures to be followed in interstate group lawsuits, should the
procedures in the CAFA also affect judicial analysis of collective actions under section 16(b)?
In section 3 (a) of the CAFA, Congress apparently attempts to tie
the Act directly to Rule 23.1 57 Because Congress wishes to include
under the Act's umbrella state actions that are removed to federal
Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (2004).
See id. § 4.
Id. § 3(a) (addressing coupon settlements under § 1712).
Id. (addressing protection against loss by class members under § 1713).
Id. (addressing notifications to federal and state officials under § 1715).
"Definitions (2) Class Action" reads as follows:
(2) CLASS ACTION.-The term 'class action' means any civil action
filed in a district court of the United States under [R]ule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or any civil action that is removed to a district court
of the United States that was originally filed under a State statute or rule of
judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by I or more representatives as a class action.
Id. (providing definitions under § 1711).
152
153
154
155
156
157
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courts and not filed initially under Rule 23, however, the definition of
"class action" is broad enough to include any civil
action that was
"originally filed under a State statute or rule ofjudicial
procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representatives as a
class action." 5 8

The proposed CAFA does not address whether Con-

gress intends the Act to inform representative actions under section
16(b). As proposed, the CAFA contains no parenthetical akin to the
Advisory Committee note regarding the 1966 amendment to Rule 23
disavowing application to section 16(b). Indeed, the CAFA does not
explicitly rule out the possibility that Congress would consider a group
of section 16(b) plaintiffs and consenting members to comprise a
"class" for CAFA purposes. Most likely, though, it has simply
never
been brought to Congress's attention that any statement of congressional policy generally targeting "class actions" might directly or indirectly impact federal court analysis of section 16(b).
The very possibility that the CAFA could impact a court's thinking about the "similarly situated" standard, though, highlights a pervasive difficulty with courts' historical approach to section 16(b). As
traced in the sections above, when federal courts have been presented
with cases filed under section 16(b), the typical response has been to
look to categories within the Rules to answer the following questions:
"What is this device?" and "How is it supposed to operate?" Recognizing that section 16(b) has characteristics of both a permissive joinder
device and of a class action, the courts have termed section 16(b) a
"hybrid." The term "hybrid," however, implies that section 16(b) was
spawned by combining features of "parent" provisions that exist in
"pure" form within the Rules. Treating section 16(b) in
this way, however, means that every alteration to the parent provisions causes a reassessment of the hybrid to see if the latter's structure has also been
changed. In effect, therefore, the histories of Rule 20 and Rule 23
become the history of section 16(b) despite the fact that Congress has
never tied section 16(b) to either Rule even at those historical points
when it clearly had the opportunity to do so. Both section 16(b) and
Rule 23 should be allowed to develop on their own without substantial
alterations or additions t6 one's provisions necessarily impacting the
analysis of the other. Thus, the possibility of the CAFA's passage emphasizes the timeliness of allowing section 16(b) to emerge from the
shadow of the Rules and be understood as a legitimate, functioning
statutory mechanism in its own right.
This is not to say, however, that the proposed CAFA offers nothing of value to the federal courts' future approach to section 16(b).
158 Id.
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For, at a minimum, the CAFA captures a current mood on Capitol
Hill that the courts should carefully consider. That mood is quite
clearly characterized by suspicion of attorney practices and concern
that defendants are being subjected to inordinate pressure to settle
15 9
Incases when classes of plaintiffs are certified for trial purposes.
Notice
Legislative
Committee's
Policy
Republican
Senate
U.S.
deed, the
No. 42B explicitly incorporates the term 'judicial blackmail" to describe the pressure placed even upon defendants with meritorious defenses to settle a claim rather than face an expensive trial on the
160 The proposed CAFA,
merits or risk encountering a "runawayjury."
therefore, emphasizes that plaintiff and court interests are not the
only interests that deserve, or perhaps even demand, the courts' attention in representative actions. Instead, courts must also consider and
protect valid defendant interests to preserve the respect due the courts
consequences to society
and to minimize any negative economic
16 1
litigation.
class
caused by unpredictable
The concerns prompting the CAFA, therefore, reinforce the suggested approach to section 16(b) outlined in the previous section of
this Note. That is, courts should promote the remedial purposes of
the statutes that incorporate section 16(b) by employing the flexible
two-tiered, ad hoc approach to certification and by recognizing a presumption of informed, adequately protected, consenting members.
Concurrently, the courts must take into account judicial concerns of
159 See S. 2062- The Class Action Fairness Act, LEGIS. NOTICE 42B (U.S. Senate Republican Policy Comm., Washington, D.C.),July 7, 2004, at 4-5 [hereinafter S. 2062]
(bemoaning the "lawyer-driven class action industry" and the costs of "runaway litigaavailable at http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/
tion" to the national economy),
recent comments by President Bush in his
the
also
Consider
L42BClassActionSD.pdf.
State of the Union Address on February 2, 2005. George W. Bush, State of the Union
Address (Feb. 2, 2005), in 151 CONG. REc. H340-03 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2005) (emphasizing the need for class action reform), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/re2
00 5
020 -1 1.html.
leases/2005/02/2
160 S. 2062, supra note 159, at 5. It is beyond the scope of this Note to examine to
what degree defendants in class action suits are in fact subjected to excessive settlement pressure through improper class certification. It suffices for present purposes
to note the current mood on Capitol Hill, and among some judges and commentators, treating class actions as suspect for at least potentially forcing defendants into
"blackmail settlements." For a provocative challenge to the validity of the blackmail
charge in the class action setting, see Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003).
See S. 2062, supra note 159, at 5 (complaining of the "higher prices and lower
161
wages" that result when employers are "blackmailed," while noting that "[w]hen litigation costs become too unpredictable, the effect will be to dissuade investment, discourage entrepreneurship, increase the costs of risk planning, and threaten the core
activities essential to our economy").
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fairness and efficiency as well as valid defendant concerns, in part by
ensuring that individual questions do not predominate in the action.
Courts must not become so absorbed in defining "similarly situated"
through identifying a uniform set of factors to consider that they lose
the forest for the trees. That is, courts must not lose sight of the ultimate balancing of plaintiff, defendant, and court interests that must
occur for section 16(b) to function optimally as a remedial representative device.
Ideally, if and when a final version of the CAFA is passed, Congress will make explicit that the CAFA is not intended to affect the
operation of representative actions filed pursuant to section 16(b). In
the absence of such a declaration, the courts will hopefully recognize
that, having a life of its own, section 16(b) is not impacted by such
amendments to class action procedure under the Rules barring a specific statement by Congress to the contrary. In the meantime, courts
should promote an approach to section 16(b) that evinces to Congress that they are already in practice effectively addressing in the section 16(b) context the concerns that have given rise to the CAFA.
CONCLUSION

A Tonight Show audience accustomed to the benign teasing in
Leno's 'Jaywalking" exploits may well chafe at the crude, in-your-face,
confrontational antics of Conan's mascot, Triumph the Insult Comic
Dog. Perhaps the audience will pressure Conan to forsake his favored
skit-based comedy routines for the longer, stand-up monologue style
that Leno uses to open the current show. It may even be that an older
audience, pining for the big-band tunes of Doc Severenson, will
cringe when Max Weinberg's music introduces Conan to the crowd.
Just maybe, though, the audience will come to accept that the Tonight
Show under Conan O'Brien will only suffer if his personal creativity is
stifled under pressure to "be like Jay," or Johnny, or even Jack.
Conan's Tonight Show will surely seek to accomplish familiar goals:
entertaining audiences through a mixture of offbeat comedy, personal interviews, fresh comedians, and musical guests. Yet Conan's
particular adaptation of the show will never truly be successful if the
audience doggedly fixates on comparisons to Conan's predecessors
and refuses to let Conan's show develop on its own. Fortunately for
Conan, the transition period looms long, and the audience has several
years to familiarize itself with Conan's modus opperandi and to grow
comfortable with Conan's idiosyncratic style.
The federal courts have had almost seventy years to become familiar with section 16(b) and its "similarly situated" standard. It is
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news to no one that district court judges are in the main a conservative audience, who by training, and occasionally by mandate, value
consistency, predictability, and uniformity. Judges can be especially
hesitant to embrace "squishy" standards when concrete, well-defined
rules promise a logical, sequential reasoning process that can be
strictly applied.162 Section 16(b)'s flexibility, however, is critical injudicial efforts to manage FLSA, EPA, and ADEA collective actions while
properly respecting the panoply of litigant, court, and even societal
interests implicated in those representative suits. At this point, there
is ample precedent and history upon which the courts may draw to
flesh out section 16(b) without relying upon wholesale incorporation
of, or unrelenting comparisons to, any specific provisions within the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is high time for section 16(b) to
emerge from the shadows of the Rules and to be appreciated as a
unique representative action mechanism deserving of its own identity
and function. Given the chance to stand on its own, this less-familiar,
seemingly obscure little rule of civil procedure will not disappoint.

162 The contest between flexible standards and carefully delineated tests is played
out in many contexts within the courts. For another representative instance of judicial disagreement about the respective merits of flexible approaches and unyielding
rules, consider Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), where the Supreme Court decided to forsake the two-pronged test to examining the sufficiency of probable cause
in warrant applications established in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), in
favor of a more "fluid concept" of probable cause and a totality of the circumstances
approach. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 232.
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